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CORRECTION 
Appellant's brief erroneously quote the 
policy of Western Casualty and Surety on page 
17. The correct language is as follows: 
" ••• (a) the unqualified word insured 
includes, (1) such named insured and 
spouse, (2) any relative of such named 
insured or spouse, ••• " 
ARGUMENT I 
WESTERN'S POLICY ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE AN 
ADDITIONAL BURDEN OF CONSENT NOT PERMITTED BY 
LAWo 
The Safety Responsibility Act specifies 
the person whose consent must be given to the 
use of other vehicles. Section 41-12-21, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 reads as follows: 
" ••• (b) such owners policy of lia-
bility insurance: (1) shall designate 
by explicit description or by appro-
priate reference all motor vehicles 
with respect to which coverage is 
thereby to be granted; and (2) shall 
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insure the person named therein and 
any other person, as insured, using 
any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles 
with the express or implied permission 
of such named insured, and against 
loss from liability imposed by law for 
damages arising out of the ownership, 
maintainence or use of such motor 
vehicles with the United States of 
America or the Dominion of Canada, ••• " 
(emphasis added) 
Western's policy provides for permission 
of the owner rather than the named insured. 
There is no question in the facts that the 
named insured, to-wit: Dan Allison, gave his 
consent to Rick Lee Allison to use the vehicle 
of James Maddox, the owner. There is no evi-
dence that the named insured in any manner 
restricted the permission of Rick Allison. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE APPELLANT HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL OBLIGA· 
TIONS UNDER WESTERNuS POLICY AND IS AN INSURED 
ENTITLED TO PROTECTION UNDER ITS TERMSo 
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Wes tern 0 s policy specifically insured Rick 
Lee Allison and Dan Allison in the use of other 
vehicles when the use is with the express or 
implied permission of the ownero That permis-
sion to use the vehicle was given is not in 
question. The respondent, however, urges upon 
the Court that the Court should read into the 
policy a provision requiring, not merely use 
by permission, but use within the scope of per-
mission. Few provisions in the law have created 
more conflicting results. Several cases, how-
ever, have faced the issue squarely. Dickinson 
Vo Maryland Casualty Company, 101 Conno 369, 
125 A 866, set forth the common rules of inter-
pretation0 The clause involved in the insurance 
policy under consideration was as follows: 
" • • • 
the permission of the named insured." 
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court, in discussing the issue, stated, 
"Does this language mean the permis-
sion to use the car or the permission 
to use the car in a specified manner 
and for a specified purpose? These 
are the two constructions which con-
front us and we are to determine 
which is the correct one ••• Let 
us see how the law construes a 
provision of a contract of insurance 
which invites two constructionso o • 
Construing this provision in the 
light of settled rules of construc-
tion, we must adopt, between the 
two claimed constructions, that which 
is most favorable to the insured •• o 
In the presence of a reasonable 
doubt we must resolve it in favor of 
the insured. Between two interpre-
tations we are required by the rules 
of legal construction to adopt that 
which will sustain this claim." 
The Court went on to state: 
"In place of a certain provision in 
the policy of definite meaning it 
would insert a provision breeding 
uncertainty, inviting litigation, 
and making the defense of a depar-
ture from the permission an available 
and of ten used defense. This is 
exactly what the courts and the 
legislature have frowned upon --
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uncertainty and ambiguous provisions 
in contracts of insurance under which 
insurers seek an escape from the obli-
gation of paying the insurance indem-
nity contracted for. The fact that 
the insurer in this case did not so 
restrict the term 'permissiong is 
strong evidence that it did not, by 
this provision, indend this; to 
justify the strict construction claimed 
by the defendant would convert all 
cases of this character into a con-
test as to the exact words spoken 
when permission was secured, and to 
an attempt upon the court to convert 
by refinement any use of the car into 
a departure sufficient to annul the 
permission granted. If the departure 
were from the place permitted, be it 
near or far, or from the purpose 
named, be it substantial or otherwise, 
the insured must fail in his recovery. 
A defense of that character by an 
insurer is not favored in law ••• " 
The Tennessee Court faced a similar pro-
blem in the case of Masser v. American Mutual 
Liability and Insurance Company (1951), 241 SW 
2d 856. The court there distinguished a pre-
vious case of Stovall Vo New York Indemnity 
Company, 157 Tenno 391, 8 SW 2d 473. The 
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Stovall case had constructed a provision of 
a policy, to-wit: " ••• provided such use or 
operation is with the permission of the named 
insured." The policy in the Masser case con-
tained a provision requiring permission for the 
"actual use" of the vehicle. The court inter-
pret ted the provision to mean ". • • use to 
which the vehicle is being put at the time of 
the accident rather than use by 1 permission'." 
See also: Grella v. Reynolds, 151 Ohio State 
147, 85 NE 2d 116 (1969); Hartford Accident 
and Indemnity Company v. Peach, 193 Va. 206, 
68 SE 2d 520. 
Similarly in the case of Schmidt Vo 
Utility Insurance Company, (1944), 182 SW 2d 
181, the court declared the rules of interpre-
tation of insurance poiicies wherein the language 
is suseptable to two interpretations. 
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"Keeping in mind, however, the estab-
lished rules for the construction of 
insurance contracts, to-wit: that 
a policy must be liberally constructed 
in favor of the insured so as not to 
defeat, without a plain necessity, 
his claim for indemnity which in 
making the insurance it was his object 
to secure; and that when words are 
suseptable to 'two interpretations, 
that which will sustain insured's 
claim must be adopted, since the lan-
guage employed in the policy is that 
of the insurer ••• " (page 183) 
Also in the case of Rikowski v. Fidelity 
and Company, 117 NJL 407, 189 A 102, 116 NJL 
503, 185 A 473, the court declared: 
"It is within the field of general 
knowledge that the usual indemnity 
policy is, except where a statute 
intervenes, framed by the company 
whose product it is and that the per-
son to whom a policy is issued accepts 
it in the form offered and pays for 
it that which is asked, else he does 
not get it. The named insured may 
accept the contract or he may reject 
it 0 But he does not write it. So 
the defendant company chose the 
phraseology in which its obligation 
is set forth. It could, by the 
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contract, have narrowed its obliga-
tion but one would expect that if, 
in the light of the public policy and 
the general public attitude ••• , 
it proposed so to do, it would have 
phrased its contract in words more 
restricted than those now before us." 
The New Jersey Court has also declared 
the rules of interpretation, to-wit: "The 
generally recognized approach of the courts 
is to give an onmibus clause in an automobile 
liability policy a liberal interpretation, to 
effectuate the public policy of affording 
injured persons protection. Costanzo v. 
Ienn Threshermen and Farmers Mutual Casualty 
Insurance Company (1959), 30 NJ 262, 152 A 2d 
589, 592. 
There has been a strong tendency of the 
courts and leglislatures to adopt the "initial 
permission rule." This rule has been defined 
as: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-10-
"o •• if a person is given permission 
to use a motor vehicle in the first 
instance, any subsequent use short 
of theft or the like while it remains 
in his possession, thQugh not within 
the contemplation of the parties, is 
a permissive use within th~ terms of 
an onmibus clause ••• " Matits v. 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 
33 N. J. 488, 166 A 2d 345, 349. 
New Jersey, in the Matits case, put its 
finger on the precise problem: 
"• •• It is our view that these 
later rules making coverage turn on 
the scope of permission given in the 
first instance renders coverage 
uncertain in many cases, foster liti-
gation as to the existence or extent 
of any alleged deviations, and alti-
mately inhibit achievement of the 
legislative goals. We think that the 
'initial permission' rule best 
effectuates the legislative policy 
of providing certain and maximum cov-
erage and is consistent with the language 
of the standard omnibus clause in 
automobile insurance policies." 
See also: United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty Company v. DeCuers, (1940; DCLA), 125 
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A 866; Jefson v. London Guaranty and Accident 
Company, 293 Ill. App. 97, 11 NE 2d 993; Fire-
man's Fund Indemnity Company v. Freeport Insur-
ance Company, 30 Illo App. 2d 69, 173 NE 2d 534; 
Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191; Small 
v. Schuncke, 42 N.J. 407, 201 A 2d 56; Holly V• 
Indemnity Insurance Company, 257 NoC• 381, 126 
SE 2d 161; Dickinson v. Great American Indemnity 
Company, 296 Mass. 368, 6 NE 2d 439; Stoveall 
v. New York Indemnity Company, Supra.; Arnold 
v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 
(CA 7 Indo), 260 F 2d 161; Jones v. New York 
Casualty Company, (DC 1938), 23 F. Supp 932; 
72 ALR 1398, 1405; 106 ALR 1251, 1262; 126 ALR 
544, 553; 5 ALR 2d 600, 629. 
The issue is before the Court for the 
first time in Utah so far as can be determined 
by the authoro It is urged upon the court that 
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a strict interpretation of the permission 
required serves a public purpose. It is even 
intimated that in the event a driver goes 
beyond the scope of his permission that the 
owner does not then desire to extend protection 
to the driver. It seems most unlikely that with 
imputed liability that either Dan Allison or 
James Maddox would intend that the policy not 
provide coverage in such case. It is further 
suggested that such a rule may in some manner 
reward the insured by obtaining for him re-
duced premiums as a result of the alleged 
resultant low level of accidents. The ob-
vious conclusion, however, is that such a rule 
completely removes the coverage from the control 
of these persons who are imputedly liable for 
any injuries that occur, and further, leaves 
the injured without recourse in many cases. 
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To suggest to this court that it is good for 
the insured that the court rule that he is not 
covered by his insurance policy that he bought 
and paid for seems to require no response 0 
Transamerica's policy designates the ine 
sured as follows: 
"• •• (b) with respect to an unowned 
automobile, o •• (2) any relative, 
but only with respect to a private 
passenger automobile or trailer, pro-
vided its actual operation or (if he 
is not operating) the other actual 
use thereof is with the permission, 
or reasonably believed to be with 
the permission, of the owner and is 
within the scope of such permission, 
and (3) any other person or organ-
ization not owning or hiring the 
automobile, but only with respect 
to his or its liability because of 
acts or of missions of an insured 
under (b) (1) or (2) above. 
Since the issue of an emergency (stranted 
motorist) was never discussed, did the driver 
(16 year-old Rick Allison) reasonably believe 
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that he was forbidden by James Maddox or Dan 
Allison from assisting the stranted motorist? 
The scope of permission is a question of fact 
for the jury. Stowe v. Hawkeye Casualty Co~­
pany of DesMoines, Iowa, 193 F 2d 255. Both 
James Maddox and Dan Allison are available to 
testify. Such testimony would show a consistent 
pattern and history, all of which the driver 
was exposed to, of assistance and accommodation 
to parties in need. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should not read into a policy 
language that defeats the public policy or that 
leads to uncertainty and confusion. If the 
policy of Western's had intended that scope of 
permission be a part thereof, it would have so 
provided. In any event, Utah should adopt the 
"initial permission" rule. The facts in the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-15-
case are without dispute; permission was given. 
Certainly the clear language of Western Casualty's 
policy imposed no greater burden upon the appel-
lanto The issue.of the stranted motorist was 
never discussed. There is sufficient evidence 
that this driver could have reasonably believed 
that such assistance was permittedo The deci-
sioh of the trial court on the Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment of the respondents should be 
reversed. The appellantvs Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John L. Chidester 
Attorney for Appellant 
Dan Allison 
51 West Center Street 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
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